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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we address a question that has been raised to each of
us innumerable times since we began to practice law: "How can you
possibly represent to the court what your client is asking for?" We are
asked this question - and many variations on the theme - because of
who our clients are: by and large, persons who have been committed to,
or had been committed to, or are subject to being committed to) psy-
chiatric institutions.
For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to start with a bit
about us.1 Before becoming a law professor, the first author (MLP) liti-
gated on behalf of persons with mental disabilities in the civil and crim-
inal justice system for eleven years: three years as the head of the Mer-
cer County (Trenton, NJ) Office of the Public Defender, and eight
years as director of the Division of Mental Health Advocacy in the NJ
Department of the Public Advocate.2 The second author (NMW) has
spent six years doing similar work with the Mental Hygiene Legal Ser-
vice in NYC, and continues to do so. So, the questions we address here
1 We realize that this information is usually shortened and relegated to an asterisked foot-
note after the title of the article. We include it in the body of the text here, however, to empha-
size how the issues we discuss in this paper have always been central to our practices.
2 While he was a professor, besides teaching multiple courses in mental disability law and
other subjects, MLP provided legal services to persons with mental disabilities through a "live
client" clinic (Federal Litigation Clinic), through a "placement" clinical-type program (Mental
Disability Litigation Seminar and Workshop) and through an advocacy/human rights-based
clinic (Building a Disability Rights Information Center in Asia and the Pacific Clinic).
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are ones that we have confronted hundreds of times in "real life" as
practicing attorneys.
And, more times than we care to count, we have been asked-
dating back to the 1970s in MLP's case-"how can you represent those
people?!"3 In the context of mental disability law cases, it is sometimes
slightly more nuanced: "How can you argue that your client has a right
to refuse treatment?" (Or, "how can you argue that your client has a
right to sexual interaction?" (Or, "how can you argue [insert description
of controversial legal issue]?").4
These have never been particularly complicated questions for us to
answer. We believe that lawyers have an ethical responsibility to repre-
sent their clients in accordance with their clients' wishes.5 But-focusing
3 This is not a particularly original question. See e.g., How Can You Represent Those
People? (Abbe Smith & Monroe Freedman eds., 2013); James S. Kunen, How Can You Defend
Those People?: The Making of a Criminal Lawyer (1983).
4 Organized psychiatry staked out a contrary position quickly. See e.g., Darold A. Treffert,
Dying with Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1041 (1973); Paul S. Appelbaum &
Thomas G. Gutheil, Rotting With Their Rights On: Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in
Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979). Of
course, "anecdotal accounts of patients who have 'died with their rights on' are easily countered
by other stories of patients who, under looser commitment criteria, have been needlessly con-
fined for decades." See Douglas S. Stransky, Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treat-
ment: Resolving Disputes from a Due Process Perspective, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 413, 418 n. 31
(1996), citing Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Com-
mitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 67-79 (1982). See Grant Morris, Judg-
ing Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 343, 343 (1995) (discussing this issue in the context of the right to refuse medi-
cation). Similarly, in this context, Dr. Paul Chodoff recommended exercising "wise and benevo-
lent paternalism," leading to a "moral judgment" that hospitalization is appropriate for patients
"incapable of voluntarily accepting help," in spite of laws rejecting "need of treatment" as a
commitment standard. Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntay Hospitad.Zation ofthe Mental# Il, 133
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 501 (1976). For a response to Dr. Chodoff, see Michael L. Perlin, Mo-
rality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of Ordinary Common Sense, Heuristic Reasoning,
and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991).
It should be noted that Professors Appelbaum and Gutheil have, in subsequent years, been
among the leading psychiatrists who have pointed out that the "ordinary common sense" as-
sumption that psychiatric patients are globally incompetent to engage in independent and au-
tonomous decision-making is erroneous. See infra note 16, and text accompanying note 18.
s There is extensive literature about this in the context of the criminal law, but far less in
the context of mental disability law. For a rare example, see Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher
Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in Guardianship Pro-
ceedings, 4 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 353-54 (2011), quoted in this context in
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here more closely on civil matters involving persons in the mental disa-
bility law system-the answers to these questions are complicated here
in the public's view because of the erroneous, sanist,6 and pretextual7
assumption that persons institutionalized because of mental disabilities
are presumptively incompetent to engage in autonomous decision-
making,8 and that the lawyer should substitute his/her "ordinary com-
mon sense"9 as to the client's "best interests,"10 a position often abet-
ted by the use of the vividness heuristic.11 A model of "paternal-
Michael L. Perlin, Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail: Using TherapeuticJuriprudence to Remediate the Criminal-
ifration of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MiCH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 343, 369 (2013): "It is not rea-
sonable to expect a client to repose trust in an attorney unless she is confident that he is acting
in accordance with her wishes."
6 Sanism is an "irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational
prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homo-
phobia, and ethnic bigotry." Michael L. Perlin, 'They Keep ItAll Hid": The Ghetoi.ation ofMental
Disability Law and Its Implcations for LegalEducation, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 857, 860-61 (2010). See
infra text accompanying notes 40-65.
7 Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) tes-
timonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-
making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends. See Michael L. Perlin, And
My Best Friend, My Doctor/ Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got: The Role and Significance of Counsel in
Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 735, 750 (2005); Perlin, supra note 4. See
infra text accompanying notes 66-75.
8 See Michael L. Perlin, Everybod Is Making Love! Or Else Expecting Rain: Considering the Sex-
ual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionaiyed Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in
Asia, 83 U. WASH. L. REV. 481, 503 (2008), discussing the myth that "mentally ill individuals are
presumptively incompetent to participate in 'normal' activities [or] to make autonomous deci-
sions about their lives."
9 "[O]rdinary common sense" is a .. prereflective attitude' exemplified by the attitude of
'What I know is "self-evident"; it is "what everybody knows."' Keri K. Gould & Michael L.
Perlin, 'Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudnce and Clinical Teach-
ing, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 339, 357 (2000) (citing Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance:A
Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1988). See infra text
accompanying notes 95-104.
10 On how some commentators believe that the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (especially Rule 1:14) "give lawyers representing the mentally disabled 'unchecked authori-
ty,' see Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley, Deaing with the Mentally Incapacitated Client: The Ethi-
cal Issues Facing the Attorny, 33 FAM L.Q. 329, 330 (1999), quoting Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu
Lanyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1429, 1436 (1994) (discussing the role of
the lawyer as de facto guardians under the rule). On Rule 1:14 in this context, see infra text ac-
companying notes 118-22.
11 The vividness heuristic is the cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single vivid,
memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices
should be made." Michael L. Perlin, 'The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanit
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IowA L. REv.
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ism/best interests" is regularly substituted for a traditional legal advo-
cacy position, and this substitution is rarely questioned.12
Our position is a simple one: this presumption flies in the face of
statutory law,13 constitutional law,14 and international human rights
law,15 and must be rejected. It also is contrary to the principles of the
school of therapeutic jurisprudencel6 with which we both firmly align
ourselves.17 Moreover, this presumption is also contrary to all the valid
and reliable evidence that has been available for decades.'8
Virtually no one ever says that a lawyer should substitute his/her
view of "best interests" in a divorce case, a malpractice case, or a con-
tract case. Consider the recent case of Kevin Durant, the star profes-
sional basketball player. Apparently, Durant was offered $40.7 million
dollars to return to play another season for the Oklahoma City Thun-
der,19 but he turned that down for a contract that paid $27 million per
1375, 1417 (1997) (Perlin, Borderine). In this context, one vivid, negative anecdote-perhaps
even an apocryphal one with no basis in fact-overwhelms an extensive contrary statistical data-
base. Michael L. Perlin, "Simpfiy You, Classi You": Stigma, Stereotpes and Civil Rights in Disabiig
Classfication Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 637 (2009) (Perlin, Borderne). See supra text ac-
companying notes 76-94, for an extended discussion of the significance of heuristics in this
context.
12 Perlin, supra note 7, at 738; see also Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A Critical Evalua-
lion of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 43-44 (1992).
13 E.g., State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 831 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., specially concur-
ring).
14 E.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986).
1s G.A. Res. 61/611, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (Dec.
6, 2006)(CRPD), Article 12.
16 On the question of presumption of incompetency, see Michael L. Perlin, TherapeuticJu-
risprudence and Outpatient Commitment: Kendra's Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 183,
193 (2003) ("In short, the presumption in which courts have regularly engaged - that there is
both a de facto and de jure presumption of incompetency to be applied to medication decision
making - appears to be based on an empirical fallacy: psychiatric patients are not necessarily
more incompetent than non-mentally ill persons to engage in independent medication decision
making"); see also PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 218, 220 (1991) ("The mere presence of psychosis, dementia, men-
tal retardation, or some other form of mental illness or disability is insufficient to constitute
incompetence.'.
17 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, "Friend to the Maryr, a Friend to the Woman
of Shame": Thinking About The Law, Shame and Humiation, 24 So. CAL. REV. L. & SOc'LJUST. 1, 9-
13(2014).
18 See e.g., Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III:
Abities of Patients to Consent o Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995).
19 Marc J. Spears, Expect a Happy Ending for OKC in Durant's Free-Agent Drama, THE
UNDEFEATED (June 30, 2016), http://theundefeated.com/features/expect-a-happy-ending-for-
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year for two years to play for the Golden State Warriors, the team that
had defeated the Thunder in the 2016 NBA Western Conference fi-
nals.20 His attorney might have persuaded him to not sign the contract
(as it was less financially attractive), but no one-to our knowledge-has
ever suggested that, in such a situation, the attorney should usurp his
client's decision-making power and force him to sign another contract
with another team.21
When it comes to mental disability law, the law is clear: if there is
an issue as to the client's capacity to engage in autonomous decision-
making, then the lawyer must aid the client in supported decision-
making, rather than impose substituteddecision-making.22 This is the
centerpiece of an Article in the UN's Convention on the Rights of Per-
23sons with Disabilities (CRPD) and must be at the forefront of any
discussion of this area of law and social policy. The difference between
supported and substituted decision-making is a critical one in interna-
tional human rights law, yet is rarely discussed domestically. It is time
that that changes. In this paper, we will look at the issues that are raised
by this state of affairs, and we will focus on these points:
Why a lawyer must always honor her client's choices, even if they
are not the ones that the lawyer would have chosen, except in very lim-
okc-in-durants-free-agent-drama/.
20 Sam Amick, Kevin Durant Announces He Will Sign with Golden State Warriors, USA TODAY
(July 5, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2016/07/04/kevin-durant-nba-
free-agency/86565344/.
21 Because of the intricacies in the NBA compensation rules, Durant could have earned up
to $153 million total over five years had he stayed with Oklahoma City, whereas the most his
salary could have been with another team would be $114 million over four years, substantially
less. See Jason Part & Mark Hinog, How Kevin Durant Could Make an Extra $100 Million by Signing
a 1 -Year Contract, USA TODAY (July 4, 2016),
http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2016/ 6 / 28/12050498/kevin-durant-contract-salary-money-
nba-free-agent-rumors.
22 On how the "paradigm shift" in the CRPD from substituted to supported decision-
making is a critical one, see Robert Dinerstein, Implementing lgal Capacity under Article 12 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabiliies: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Support-
ed Decision-Making, 19 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 8, 8 (Winter 2012).
23 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind": The Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REv.
1159, 1177-78 (2013); Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making
as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II oftheAmericans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. Coto. L.
REv. 157, 161 (2010).
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ited circumstances, in accordance with the American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The implications of criminal law, elder law, and juvenile law, and
how the ethical obligations in these types of law are no different than in
cases of clients with mental disabilities or those institutionalized
The multi-textured meanings of "competency" and "capacity" and
how they affect resolution of these issues, especially in the context of
forced medication, psychiatric advance directives, and sexual autonomy
The implications of rules governing counsel-client relationships
for implementation of the supported decision-making requirement of
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities and under the American with Disabilities Act
The relationship between these issues and therapeutic jurispru-
dence, and why adherence to TJ is further demanded as a matter of
dignity24
First though, we consider the four factors that contaminate the
practice of all aspects of mental disability law: sanism,25 pretextuality,26
heuristic thinking,27 and false "ordinary common sense" (OCS).28
These factors - that we will explain in depth subsequently - must be
kept in mind at all times in any consideration of the issues at hand. We
cannot forget how they poison all of mental disability law, specifically
including what counsel does in the representation of persons with men-
29tal disabilities; it is thus impossible to give any meaning to the ques-
24 R. George Wright, Degnio and Conlcts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and
Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527 (2006)
25 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prgudice Ieaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuaky,
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3, 4-5
(1999).
26 Id. at 5.
27 See generaly Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, How Teaching about Therapeutic Juripru-
dence Can Be a Tool of Social Justice, and Lead Law Students to Personal# and Socially Rewarding Careers:
Sexualio and Disabikty as a Case Exatple, 16 NEVADA L.J. 209, 216-17 (2015).
28 See general# Michael L. Perlin, 'I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He'd Lost Control": The Im-
pact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881, 905-06
(2015).
29 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful
and Sanist Blindness to Lanyers with Mental Disabities, 69 U. Pur. L. REV. 589 (2008) (Perlin, Mir-
ror); Michael L. Perlin, Representing Clents with Mental Health and/or Cognitive Impairments In Treat-
ment Courts, American University Justice Programs Office 2016 (Perlin, Representing Clients).
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tions before us without taking these seriously.
At the same time, it is also critical that we consider how therapeu-
tic jurisprudence offers us a means of redemption.30 Again, as we will
discuss at length subsequently, therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) offers us
a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recog-
nizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic consequences.31 Its ultimate aim-to determine whether
legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to
enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles32-is one that must be central to our consideration of the
-33questions that we raise.
Our paper's title comes from Bob Dylan's song, As I Went out
One Morning,34 a song that, unfortunately, he has only performed once
in public.35 Of significance to our title is the opening couplet:
As I went out one morning
To breathe the air around Tom Paine's.36
Thomas Paine considered "rights of the mind" among the natural
liberties,37 and has often been cited as an inspiration for much of the
early litigation on behalf of persons with mental disabilities, seeking to
grant them autonomy in decision-making and behavior.38 We use the
30 Perlin, Mirror, supra note 29, at 591.
31 See Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might Have Drugs at Your Command":
Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the Perspectives of International
Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALBANY Gov'T L. REv. 381, 399 (2015).
32 See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 27, at 213.
33 On this question, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, 'Tn the Wasteland of Your
Mind": Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CuIM. L. 304 (2016) (Perlin,
Wasteland); Michael L. Perlin, "God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son": Why the Insanity Defense and the
Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilties and Basic Princrles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, AM. CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2016).




37 See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL THOMAS
PAINE 151 (1969).
38 See THOMAS SZASZ, ANTIPSYCHIATRY: QUACKERY SQUARED (2009), likening involuntary
psychiatric institutionalization to involuntary servitude, invoking Paine.
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quote from this song here to underscore that the lawyer-if s/he is to
provide constitutionally adequate representation-has no choice but to
honor her client's wishes, and to keep in mind the centrality of individ-
ual autonomy to all questions that arise in any discussion of mental dis-
ability law.39
And we believe - without equivocation - that that is a good thing.
I. THE CONTAMINATING FACTORS
A. Sanism40
Sanism infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practic-
es.41 Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. 2 It is
based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindi-
vidualization,43 and reflects the assumptions that are made by the legal
system about persons with mental disabilities-who they are, how they
got that way, what makes them different, what there is about them that
lets society treat them differently, and whether their condition is immu-
table.44 These assumptions-that reflect societal fears and gprehen-
sions about mental disability, persons with mental disabilities, and the
possibility that any individual may become mentally disabled 46--ignore
39 For an overview of some specific questions that a competent lawyer will have to ask
him/herself in the representation of persons with mental disabilities, see Perlin, Representing Cli-
ents, supra note 29, at 4.
4 This section draws significantly upon Perlin, Mirror, supra note 29, and Perlin, supra note
25.
41 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 8, at 486; see generally Michael L. Perlin, 'My Sense of Humanity
Has Gone Down the Drain": Stereotpes, Stzgma and Sanism, in STEREOTYPING AS A HUMAN RIGHTS
ISSUE 95 (Alexandra Timmer & Eva Brehms, eds. 2015).
42 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 6, at 873.
43 Id
4See e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERiCAN LAW (1990); SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF
SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985).
45 See H. Archibald Kaiser, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disahiliies: Beginning to
Examine the Implications for Canadian Lawyers' Professional Responsibities, 20 HEALTH L. REv. 26
(2012).
" See Michael L. Perlin, Competeng, Deinstitutionali.Zation, and Homelessness: A Story ofMarginal-
iration, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 108 (1991) (on society's fears of persons with mental disabilities),
and id. at 93 n.174 ("[W]hile race and sex are immutable, we all can become mentally ill, home-
less, or both. Perhaps this illuminates the level of virulence we experience here") (emphasis in
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82 CAiRDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J.
the most important question of all-why do we feel the way we do
about "these people" (quotation marks understood)?47
Decision-making in mental disability law cases is inspired by (and
reflects) the same kinds of irrational, unconscious, bias-driven stereo-
types48 and prejudices that are exhibited in racist, sexist, homophobic,
and religiously and ethnically bigoted decision-making.49 Sanist deci-
sion-making infects all branches of mental disability law and distorts
mental disability law jurisprudence. Paradoxically, while sanist deci-
sions are frequently justified as being therapeutically based, sanism cus-
tomarily results in anti-therapeutic outcomes.51
We thus ignore, subordinate, or trivialize behavioral research in
this area, especially when acknowledging that such research would be
cognitively dissonant with our intuitive (albeit empirically flawed)
views.52 "Sensational media portrayals of mental illness" exacerbate the
underlying tensions.53 We believe that "[m]ental illness can be easily
identified by lay persons and matches up closely to popular media de-
pictions."54 It is commonly assumed that persons with mental illness
cannot be trusted.5 5  Common stereotypes about people with mental
original).
47 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 25, at 17; see generally Marchell Goins, Kyneitres Good & Cori
Harley, Perceiving Others as D:Jerent: A Discussion on the Stgmatigation of the Mentally 11, 19 ANN.
Health L. 441 (2010). On how sanism is more pernicious than other stigmas, see Matthew
Large & Christopher J. Ryan, Sanism, Stigma and the Belief in Dangerousness, 46 AUST. & N.Z. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1099 (2012).
48 See e.g., Wim De Neys et al, Biased but in Doubt: Conflict and Decision Confidence, 6 PLOS ONE
1 (2011). On disability stereotypes in general, see Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Troubk, 29
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347 (2011).
49 See Perlin, On Sanism, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 373-77 (1992).
50 On the ways that judges conceptualize mental disability professionals in forensic testi-
monial contexts, see Douglas Mossman, 'Hired Guns," "Whores, " and 'Prostitutes" Case Law Refer-
ences to Clinicians ofIll Repute, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 414 (1999).
5' See e.g., David B. Wexler, justice, Mental Health, and Therapeuticjurisprudence, 40 CLEV. ST.L.
REV. 517 (1992); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David
B. Wexler ed., 1990).
52 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, A Law ofHeaing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 408, 422 (2000).
53 See Bruce J, Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Juriprudence: Severe Mental
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 837 (2009). See generally in the specific context
of sex offender law, Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, 'They're Planting Stories in the
Press": The Impact ofMedia Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Polcy 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REv. 185
(2013).
54 Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives ofJurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Pugling Role ofMiti-
gatingMentalDisability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAMEJ. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL. 239, 257 (1994).
ss See Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a Disahility
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illness include the beliefs that they are invariably dangerous, unreliable,
lazy, responsible for their illness or otherwise blameworthy, faking or
exaggrating their condition, or childlike and in need of supervision or
care.
Social science research confirms that mental illness is "one of the
most-if not the most-stigmatized of social conditions."57 Historical-
ly, individuals with psycho-social disabilities "have been among the
most excluded members of society.... Research firmly establishes that
people with mental disabilities are subjected to greater prejudice than
are people with physical disabilities."58 One might optimistically expect,
though, that this gloomy picture should be subject to change because of
a renewed interest in the integration of social science and law, and
greater public awareness of defendants with mental disabilities. One
might also expect that litigation and legislation in these areas would
draw on social science data in attempting to answer the questions at
hand.
But yet, any attempt to place mental disability law jurisprudence in
context, results in confrontation with a discordant reality: social science
is rarely a coherent influence on mental disability law doctrine.59 Rather,
the legal system selectively - teleologically 60-either accepts or rejects
social science data depending on whether or not the use of that data
meets the a priori needs of the legal system. In other words, social sci-
ence data is privileged when it supports the conclusion the fact finder
wishes to reach, but it is subordinated when it questions such a conclu-
1sghts Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1, 15 (2012), discussing K, Y, & W v. Secretary for Justice, H.K.C. 796
(2000) (explaining why applicant was rejected for a public job due to her relation to a person
with mental illness).
56 For a list of all primal myths about mental illness in this context, see Perlin, supra note
49, at 393-97.
57 SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILITIEs AcT 4-5 (2001).
58 Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disablng Prejudice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
1351, 1363-64 (2008).
s9 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 658 n.256 (1989-90) (federal legislators ignored em-
pirical evidence about the insanity defense in the debate leading to the passage of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984).
6 The legal system selectively-teleologically-either accepts or rejects social science evi-
dence depending on whether or not the use of that data meets the a priori needs of the legal sys-
tem. See Perlin, supra note 54, at 261.
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sion.61 These ends are sanist. In other words, decision-making in men-
tal disability law cases is inspired by (and reflects) the same kinds of ir-
rational, unconscious, bias-driven stereotypes and prejudices that are
exhibited in racist, sexist, homophobic, and religiously and ethnically
bigoted decision-making.
Judges are not immune from sanism. 62 "[E]mbedded in the cul-
tural presuppositions that engulf us all,"63 judges reflect and project the
conventional morality of the community; judicial decisions in all areas
of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect and per-
petuate sanist stereotypes,64 a global error that is most critical in crimi-
nal law and procedure cases. Judges' refusals to consider the meaning
and realities of mental illness cause them to act in what appears, at first
blush, to be contradictory and inconsistent ways and, teleologically, to
privilege (where that privileging serves what they perceive as a socially-
beneficial value) and subordinate (where that subordination serves what
they perceive as a similar value) evidence of mental illness.65
B. Pretextuality
Sanist attitudes lead to pretextual decisions. "Pretextuality" means
that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty
and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) deci-
sion-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses,
show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
61 Perlin, Mirror, supra note 29, at 599-600. On how elected judges are more subject to bias
in a parallel area of the law (sex offender cases), see Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 55, at 218
("Elections have a 'chilling effect' on judicial independence, and even, in the cases of appellate
judges, on the issuance of dissents from majority opinions") (citations omitted).
62 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, 'Make Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric
HospitaliZation, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 947, 976 (1997).
63 Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminag, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 329, 332 (1991).
6 See Perlin, supra note 49, at 400-01.
65 JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (1992).
66 This section draws significantly upon Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success lke Fail-
ure/and Failure's No Success at All" : Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1247, 1256 (1998) (Perlin, Exposing), and Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disabiiy
Law : The Case of Competeng, 47 U. MAMI L. REv. 625, 636 (1993) (Perlin, Pretexts).
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achieve desired ends.67 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all par-
ticipants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the
law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judg-
ing, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. 68
Pretextual devices such as condoning perjured testimony, dis-
torting appellate readings of trial testimony, subordinating statistically
significant social science data, and enacting purportedly prophylactic
civil rights laws that have little or no "real world" impact, dominate the
mental disability law landscape.69 Judges in mental disability law cases
often take relevant literature out of context,70 misconstrue the data or
evidence being offered,71 and/or read such data selectively,72 and/or
inconsistently. Other times, courts choose to flatly reject this data or
ignore its existence.74 In other circumstances, courts simply "rewrite"
factual records so as to avoid having to deal with social science data
that is cognitively dissonant with their view of how the world "ought to
be." 75
67 See e.g., Perlin, Mirror, supra note 29, at 602.
68 See Michael L. Perlin, "Through the Wild Cathedral Evening": Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory
Democrag, Professor Tenbroek, and the Rghts of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R.
413, 416-17 (2008).
69 Perlin, Exposing supra note 66, at 1257.
70 David Faigman, 'Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 577 (1991).
71 Id. at 581.
72 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 54, at 264, citing inter alia, J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a
ScientrficJuriprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 153-54 (1990).
73 See, e.g, Thomas Hafemeister & Gary Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on the Ju-
diciary, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 27 (Gary Melton
ed., 1987).
74 See, e.g., Barefoot . Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-902 (1983), discussed in this context in
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE
STATES 21-27 (2013).
75 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 54, at 264. The classic example is Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion for the court in Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-10 (approving more relaxed involuntary civil com-
mitment procedures for juveniles than for adults). See e.g., Gail Perry & Gary Melton, Precedential
Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633 (1984), critiquing
Parham.
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C Heuristics76
"Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the
implicit thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, in-
formation-processing tasks,77 the use of which frequently leads to dis-
torted and systematically erroneous decisions,78 and causes decision-
makers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information."79
One single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract,
colorless data upon which rational choices should be made.80 Empirical
studies reveal jurors' susceptibility to the use of these devices. 8 Similar-
ly, legal scholars are notoriously slow to understand the way that the
use of these devices affects the way individuals think.82 The use of heu-
ristics "allows us to willfully blind ourselves to the 'gray areas' of hu-
man behavior,"83 and predispose "people to beliefs that accord with, or
are heavily influenced by, their prior experiences."84
Experts are similarly susceptible to heuristic biases, specifically
76 This section draws significantly upon Perlin, supra note 54, at 254-55; Perlin, Pretexts, su-
pra note 66, at 660.
n See Michael L. Perlin, Pychodnamics and the Insaniy Defense: Ordinary Common Sense and
Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 12-17 (1990).
78 See Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial
by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 123 (1980-81).
7 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent o Decide Competeng Questions? Stopping the
Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957, 966 n.46 (1990), discussing John S.
Carroll & John W. Payne, The Psychology of the Parole Decision Process: A joint Application ofAttribu-
lion Theory and Information-Processing Pgychologv, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (John
S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds. 1976).
8 See e.g., Perlin, Borderline, supra note 11, at 1417, discussing David Rosenhan, Psychological
Realties andJudicialPolg 19 STAN. LAW. 10, 13 (1984).
81 Jonathan Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing VerdictAccurag Through
the Use of Overtly Probabiistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1990).
82 Thomas Tomlinson, Pattern-Based Memory and the Writing Used to Refresh, 73 TEx. L. REV.
1461, 1461-62 (1995).
83 Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a little Girl": Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and
the Irrelevance of Ordinary Common Sense, 10 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 1, 27 (2003).
8 See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 55, at 213, quoting Russell Covey, Criminal Madness: Cul-
turallconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1375, 1381 (2009).
85 See Oren Perez, Can Experts Be Trusted and What Can Be Done About It? Insights from the Bi-
ases and Heuistics iUterature, in Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective (Alberto Alemanno
& Anne-Lise Sibony, eds. 2015).
[Vol. 15:73
2016] HONOR CLIENT'S MENTAL HEALTH DECISIONS
the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking.86
Further, they frequently employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness
effect or attribution theory in their testimony. Also, biases are more
likely to be negative; individuals retain and process negative infor-
mation as opposed to positive information. 8 Judges' predispositions to
employ the same sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further con-
taminate the process.89 As discussed earlier, the vividness heuristic is "a
cognitive-simplifying device through which a 'single vivid, memorable
case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which ra-
tional choices should be made."90 Through the "availability" heuristic,
we judge the probabilit or frequency of an event based upon the ease
with which we recall it. Through the "attribution" heuristic, we inter-
pret a wide variety of additional information to reinforce pre-existing
stereotypes.92 Through the "typification" heuristic, we characterize a
current experience via reference to past stereotypic behavior.93 And
through "confirmation bias," people tend to favor information that
confirms their theory over disconfirming information.94
D. "Ordinary Common Sense'5
"Ordinary common sense" (OCS) is a "powerful unconscious an-
imator of legal decision making."96 It is a psychological construct that
86 See e.g., Perlin, Mirror, supra note 29, at 602.
87 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 66, at 629; Perlin, supra note 6, at 875; Perlin & Lynch, Waste-
land, supra note 33, at 343 n.134.
88 Kenneth D. Chestek, Of Reptiles and Vekro: The Brain's 'Negative Bias" and Persuasion, 15
NEv. L.J. 605 (2015).
89 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 66, at 629; Perlin, supra note 6, at 874-75.
90 See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 11, at 1417.
91 See e.g., id.
92 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Errort Main Document Only.'His Brain Has Been Mismanaged
with Great Skill": How Will jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42
AKRON L. REV. 885, 892 (2009).
93 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationshps, 9 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 111, 125 (1991).
94 Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 55, at 214, citing Alafair S. Burke, Improzing Prosecutorial Ded-
sion Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1594 (2006).
95 This section draws significantly upon MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR
DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINALJUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAw 31 (2013).
96 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 83, at 25.
87
88 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY 'ETHICS.
reflects the level of the disparity between perception and reality that
regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding cases involving individuals
with mental disabilities .97 OCS is self-referential and non-reflective:
"I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that
way, therefore that's the way it is."98 It is supported by our reliance
on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifving devices that distort our
abilities to rationally consider information.
Trial judges typically say, "he [the defendant] doesn't look sick to
me," or, even more revealingly, "he is as healthy as you or me." 100 In
short, advocates of OCS believe that simply by using their OCS, jurists
can determine whether defendants conform to "popular images of 'cra-
ziness."' 101 If they do not, the notion of a handicaging mental disabil-
ity condition is flatly, and unthinkingly, rejected. I Such views - re-
flecting a false OCS - are made even more pernicious by the fact that
we "believe most easily what [we] most fear and most desire." 103 Thus,
OCS presupposes two "self-evident" truths: "First, everyone knows
how to assess an individual's behavior. Second, everyone knows when
to blame someone for doing wrong." 104
E. Conclusion
It is impossible to understand any aspect of mental disability law
without coming to grips with the "malignant and corrosive impact" of
the factors we have just discussed.05 We have discussed the signifi-
cance of understanding the power of these factors in a previous article
97 Perlin, supra note 5, at 365 n.127.
98 Perlin, supra note 83, at 8.
99 Perlin, Borderline, supra note 11, at 622.
10 Michael L. Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Setting, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 143, 147 (1975).
i01 Perlin, supra note 83, at 25.
102 Id.
103 Thomas D. Barton, Violence and the Collapse of Imaginaion, 81 IowA L. REv. 1249, 1249
(1996) (book review of WENDY KAMIN ER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE: CRIME AND CULTURE (1995)).
104 Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realiies, and the Poltical World: The Anthrpology of nsanity Defense
Attitudes, 24 But. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 16-17 (1996).
105 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 83, at 6. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLN, THE HIDDEN
PREJ UDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000).
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on shame and humiliation and the law,106 and one of the co-authors
(MLP) has discussed that sig ficance in multiple papers about such
topics as the death penalty, 7 neonaticide, os criminal sentencing, 109
disability classification systems, 110  the Americans with Disabilities
Act,' and on all "aspect[s] of mental disability law."ll2 We must focus
on this reality as we consider the role of counsel in the representation
of this population.
Importantly, "it is not enough that lawyers and judges learn about
mental illness, diagnoses, etc.; it is essential that they learn also about
attitudes."ll3 Consider the disappointing results reported nearly 40
years ago by Dr. Norman Poythress-that merely training lawyer about
psychiatric techniques and psychological nomenclature made little dif-
ference in ultimate case outcomes, unless they were also trained about
attitudes.114 It is critical that lawyers understand those factors that poi-
son the entire criminal justice system in the context of the representa-
tion of persons with mental disabilities to be able to do an effective job
of representing drug court defendants.11 5
106 See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 17.
107 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Alwas Well-Hidden": The Role of Coun-
sel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 201 (1996).
108 See Perlin, supra note 83.
109 See Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental Disabiki y
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM.J. CRuM. L. 431 (1995).
110 See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 11.
111 See Perlin, supra note 59.
112 Michael L. Perlin, 'Things Have Changed": Looking at Non-institutional Mental Disabity
Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 535, 536 (2002-03).
113 Perlin, supra note 7, at 754 n.119.
114 Norman Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope aith
Expert Testimony, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 15 (1978) (Concluding that "trained" lawyers' behavior
in court was not materially different from that of "untrained" lawyers because the former
group's attitudes toward their clients had not changed. Mere knowledge of cross-examination
methods, he noted, "did not deter them from taking [the] more traditional, passive, paternal
stance towards the proposed patients." As one trainee noted: "I really enjoyed your workshop,
and I've been reading over your materials and its [sic] all very interesting, but this is the real
world, and we've got to do something with these people. They're sick.").
115 See Perlin, Representing Clents, supra note 29, at 6.
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II. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
We begin with what courts have made clear forever: "The govern-
ing standard for the representation of [persons with disabilities] is not
the protection of their best interests, but, to the extent possible, the
zealous advocacy of their expressed preferences.""6 This is at the core
of the attorney-client relationship, whether the substantive issues in
questions relate to criminal law (generally, the focus of this conversa-
tion) or other areas in which the question of "how can you do that?"
might be raised, such as elder law or juvenile law. Model rules dealing
with professional standards of practice attempt to address these ethical
issues that may arise when representing someone with diminished ca-
pacity.
A. Model Rules
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") guide attorneys through ethical issues involving
persons with diminished capacity.117 Rule 1.14 states:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered deci-
sions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether be-
cause of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has dimin-
ished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm
unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own in-
terest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, in-
cluding consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with di-
minished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective ac-
tion pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under
116 Gross v. Rell, 40 A.3d 240, 269 (Conn. 2012).
" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR Ass'N, 2015) [hereinafter ABA
Model Rules].
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Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent
reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests. 11 8
The commentary to the ABA Rule notes, "when the client is a
minor or suffers from diminished mental capacity, maintaining the or-
dinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects."1 9
However, the ABA concedes that a client with diminished capacity "of-
ten has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclu-
sions about matters affecting the client's own well-being."l20 Further,
the fact that a client suffers from a disability "does not diminish the
lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect." 21 In
cases where an attorney may have to take protective action, a client's
poor judgment does not suffice to warrant protective action under Rule
1.14(b).
Although Rule 1.14 seeks to enhance the representation of per-
sons with disabilities, the rule is inconsistent and vague in certain as-
pects, which leads to confusion when applying the rule to the practical
world.123 Rule 1.14 does not define impaired capacity or "seriously di-
minished capacity" yet places the onus on the attorney to make this de-
termination. 24 "The lack of a clear test leads to a circular [and subjec-
tive] determination of diminished capacity."125
Another criticism of the rule is that it can encourage an attorney to
disclose attorney-client communications for the purposes of institu-
tional proceedings, like guardianships or civil commitment hearings.126
Further, the rule is silent with regard to some of the most serious ethi-
cal dilemmas facing attorneys who represent clients with mental disabil-
ities including the right to refuse treatment, the right of a defendant to
choose their own defense including the rejection of an insanity defense,




122 ABA FoRmAL ETHICS Op. 96-404 (1996).
12 Elizabeth Lafitte, Model Rule 1.14: the Well-Intended Rule Still leaves Some Questions Unan-
swered, 17 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICs 313 (2003).
124 Id. at 325.
125 James D. Gallagher & Cara M. Kearney, Representing a Clent with Diminished Capacity:
Where the Law Stands and Where It Needs to Go, 16 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 607 (2003).
126 Laffitte, supra note 123, at 318.
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and the right to sexual interaction.127
Competency applies not just to the client, but to the attorney as
well.128 Model Rule 1.1 defines competent representation as having
"the legal knowledge, skill, and thoroughness and preparation necessary
for the representation."l29 Attorneys practicing elder law, disability law,
or estate planning often need to go beyond basic services in order to
serve their clients so it is important that they have the requisite
knowledge and skill to help their clients.130 An attorney must obtain in-
formed consent from the client, which is "the agreement by a person to
a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated ade-
quate information and explanation about the material risks of and rea-
sonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."l31
An attorney also has the duty to effectively communicate with the cli-
ent, which means that the lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule
1.0(e), is required by these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which
the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the law-
yer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance
not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 132
A lawyer also has to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
127 Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the
Commitment Process, 45 L. & CONTENP. PROBS. 161, 180 (1983); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.
Lynch, 'All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental Disabilties and the Competence to Have Sex, 89
WAsH. L. REv. 257 (2014).
128 See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
129 ABA Model Rules, supra note 117, at 5 1.1.
130 A. Frank Johns, Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Applied in Elder Law: The
Basics .Framed in Core Values Get Complicated Fast - MRCP 1.0-1.6, 1 NAELA J. 59, 65 (Spring
2005).
131 ABA Model Rules, supra note 117, at 5 1.0(e).
1
32 Id. at 5 1.4(a).
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representation."l33
Although the Model Rules provide a starting point for addressing
ethical issues that may arise when representing clients with mental disa-
bilities, there is much that is not covered. The overlap between crimi-
nal law, elder law, juvenile law, and mental disability law illustrate how
sanism and other biases can prevent the ethical and zealous representa-
tion for persons with disabilities. We now turn to each of these areas of
the law.
B. Criminal Law Analogies
Historically, "[t]he American lawyer's professional model is that of
zeal: a lawyer is expected to devote energy, intelligence, skill, and per-
sonal commitment to the single goal of furthering the client's interests
as those are ultimately defined by the client."134 By way of example,
Abbe Smith tells us that the requirement of zealous advocacy is "the
central ethical mandate for criminal lawyers."1 35 The question that we
must confront is this: Can it/should it/may it be any less of a "central
ethical mandate" for lawyers who represent persons with mental disa-
bilities?l36 It is not insignificant that the phrase "zealous advocacy" has
been used in over 2400 published cases but, when the phrase < /p "civ-
il commitment" "psychiatric hospitalization"> is added to a
WESTLAW search, there are zero cases to be found.137
There is nothing in the law-or in valid/reliable research-that ells
us that there should be any difference in the cases of representation of
persons with mental disabilities. We know, of course, that a client's
mental health and cognitive impairment matter at every stage of the
lawyer-client relationship in the criminal justice process, from the first
meeting to case strategizing to the plea/trial decision to the sentencing
process and beyond. At each juncture, defense counsel must take seri-
133 Id.
1 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 578 (1986).
135 Abbe Srith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1585, 1589 (1999)_
16 See generally John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution ofJudgment: Ethics and the Men-
tally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 207 (2008).
137 WESTLAW search conducted Aug. 16, 2016.
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ously all issues related to such impairments.138 But this reality has never
been effectively "translated" into the civil commitment process.
In this context, reflect on the circumstances of institutionalization
in se,139 and its impact on an individual's sense of self.140 Think also of
the overlap between those in the criminal justice system and those in
the institutional mental health system.141 And think of the tension that
may arise - in most cases, inevitably arises - in the ethical decision-
making rocess in the context of representing a client with mental disa-
bilities. As in the criminal context, it is just as important when repre-
senting someone with mental illness to make sure that the process lacks
coercion, especially when considering issues of informed consent in
treatment issues.
Professor John King clearly sets out the blueprint for counsel, in
the context of criminal cases, and we see no reason it should be other-
wise in civil cases:
The conscientious defense lawyer should attempt not to do neces-
sarily what is "best" for the mentally impaired client, but attempt to
138 See general# Perlin, Representing Clients, supra note 29, at 1.
139 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (explaining "significant impact" of
social stigma generated by involuntary psychiatric institutionalization in America).
140 See e.g., Bruce Winick, TherapeuticJuriprudence and the Treatment of People with Mental Illness
in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
537, 554-55 (2002) ("For many patients, even those with serious mental illness, hospitalization
can be iatrogenic, creating an institutional dependency that such facilities often condition in
their inmates and a form of learned helplessness that debilitates motivation and effective func-
tioning and produces a form of clinical depression."), citing, inter aba, Edmund G. Doherty,
La being Effects in Psychiatric HospitaliZation: A Studj of Dirging Patterns of Inpatient Self-L beling Pro-
cess, 32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 562-63 (1975), and Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278,
308 (D. Md. 1979) ("inappropriate and excessive hospitalization fosters deterioration, institu-
tionalization, and possible regression").
141 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Institutional Forensic Psychiaty: The
Core Issues, in THE USE OF COERCIVE MEASURES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CARE: LEGAL,
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 9 (Profs. Birgit Vollm &Norbert Nedopil, eds., 2016);
Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, 'You That Hide Behind Walls": The Relationsh Between
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention Against Torture and the Treat-
ment of InstitutionaRyed Forensic Patients, in TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN HEALTH-CARE
SETTINGS: A COMPILATION 195 (American University Center on Humanitarian Law ed., 2013).
142 King, supra note 136, at 209.
143 Erin Talati, When A Soonful of Sugar Doesn't Help the Medicine Go Down: Informed Consent,
Mental Illness and Moral Ageng, 6 INO. HEALTH L. REV. 171 (2009) ("...coercing 'consent' for
treatment in mentally ill patients legally and ethically invalidates informed consent.").
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discern what the client's wishes would be absent the mental impairment
that prevents the client from making a rational decision. This approach
could include consultations not only with the client but also with family
members and others who are close with the defendant. Such an ap-
proach may be cumbersome and is certainly easier in theory than in
practice. It has, however, the virtues of imposing some sort of check on
the discretion of the defense lawyer and of honoring the true autonomy
of the client.144
But, somehow, this seems "different" to so many of us, in large
part because we (the global "we") assume that persons institutionalized
because of mental disability are presumptively incompetent to enter in-
to autonomous decision-making.145 This is a reflection of the basest
sort of sanism that contaminates the legal process and often poisons
the attorney-client relationship. Consider, from this perspective, the
question of whether lawyers are very different than, say, police officers
in this context. We know that "[police] officers' stereotypes included
the idea that it is not possible to have a meaningful conversation with
[persons with mental disabilities,] and officers hold on to the idea that
[mentally disabled] persons are completely irrational and cannot be rea-
soned with."l46 Can we safely say that lawyers, in the aggregate, are any
different?
This sanist assumption (fueled by the vividness heuristic and false
OCS) is rebutted by (1) case law and statutes that explicitly forbid mak-
144 King, supra note 136, at 264.
145 See Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9
CLNICAL L. REv. 683, 696-97 (2003); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, '7s It More
than Dodging lions and Wastin' Time?": Adequay of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the judicial
Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 114, 121 (1996),
citing Brian Ladds et al., The Disposition of Criminal Charges After Involuntary Medication to Restore
Competency to Stand Trial, 38 J. FORENS. Sc. 1442 (1993) (showing how this is regularly done by
hospital psychiatrists); Brian Ladds et al., Involuntary Medication of Patients Who Are Incompetent to
Stand Trial A Descrptive Study of the New York Experience with judicial Review, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCH. & L. 529 (1993).
146 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, 'Had to be Held Down by Big Police": A Therapeutic
jurisprudence Perspective on Interactions between Police and Persons with Mental Disabilities, FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. (2016, forthcoming) (quoting Robert Panzarella & Justin 0. Alecia, Polce Tactics in
Incidents with Mentally Disturbed Persons, 20 POLICING: INT'LJ. POLICE STRAT. & MGMT. 326, 335-
36 (1997).
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ing this presumptive assumption,147 and (2) the best available research
(from the MacArthur Group and others) that tells us that mental pa-
tients are not inherently more incompetent than non-mentally ill medi-
cal patients.148 As Professor William Brooks has perceptively noted,
"That psychiatrists do not generally complain about intensive cross-
examination in other legal contexts may well mean the general lack of
adversarialness in the civil commitment context has created an expecta-
tion that patients' lawyers should play only a perfunctory role in the
,,149commitment process.
C Conclusion
Consider the specific circumstances of the issues we are addressing
here in these contexts. When the presumption of incompetency exists,
so too does the possibility for disparate treatment of people-virtually
always improperly-deemed incompetent. As noted above, our research
in this area and our experience as trial lawyers shows that this is most
prevalent in cases involving the refusal of medication so and the right to
147 See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986) (construing N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 33.01 (McKinney 1986)) (There, the court specifically rejected the defendants' argument
that involuntarily committed mental patients were "presumptively incompetent" to exercise this
right because involuntary commitment included an implicit determination "that the patient's
illness has so impaired his judgment as to render him incapable of making decisions regarding
treatment and care.").; see general# MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL
DISABILTY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 8-6.3.1 (3d ed., 2016); Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
145. It should be pointed out that this is a relatively new development in the law. As recently as
1972, a federal district court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that had presumed the opposite: a
civilly committed individual was presumed to be incompetent, although that presumption was re-
buttable. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S.
473 (1974).
148 See e.g., Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 18.
149 William Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence ly the
Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259, 288 (2010). See id.:
In the civil commitment context, instances of vigorous cross-examination often gen-
erate hostility from both judges and psychiatric witnesses. Judges often discourage
zealous advocacy and make clear vigorous representation does not impact the deci-
sion-making process when the position put forth by counsel controverts the opinions
put forth by psychiatric experts. As a result, attorneys will limit their advocacy efforts
to what they believe judges will tolerate.
150 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 145.
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engage in voluntary sexual interaction' 5 -the two precise categories of
cases in which the "how can you do that?" question is most often
raised to lawyers. These questions, of course, ignore the fact that courts
have ruled-with virtually no exceptions-that competent patients who
are not currently an active danger to self or others have a constitutional
152
right to refuse antipsychotic medication, and that institutionalized
patients had a right to engage in voluntary sexual relations as an aspect
of the patient's rights to be placed either in the "least restrictive envi-
ronment."1 53 But, of course, these decisions are dissonant with the
community's (false) "ordinary common sense.',154
The task of improving the skills level of defense counsel in the
representation of persons with mental disabilities thus has to be ap-
proached on two parallel, interlocking tracks:
1. Education about mental disabilities and their impact on defend-
ants in the criminal justice system, especially those in drug courts, and
2. Education about factors that contaminate the entire criminal
justice process: sanism, pretextuality, heuristics, and the use of false
"ordinary common sense."
It is clear that unless the second track is included, education about
disabilities - standin alone - is not a sufficient predicate for systemic
meaningful change.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF COUNSEL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN
RELATED/OVERLAPPING AREAS OF THE LAW
In this section, we will consider the issues we are discussing in
151 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 127. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & AusoN J. LYNCH,
SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016).
152 E.g. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (individual case), supp'l, 476 F.
Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (class action), modgied, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), en banc, vacated, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), and on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983>.
153 Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983). See Michael L. Perlin, "Hospitaked
Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction": Beond the Last Frontier? 20 NYU REV. L. & SOC'L
CHANGE 517, 521 (1993-94) ("Rules that appear intended to protect individuals with mental
disabilities by limiting or subordinating their sexual autonomy are actually the product of a pat-
ronizing paternalism toward persons with mental disabilities in institutions.").
154 See supra note 9.
155 Perlin, Representing Clients, supra note 29, at 4.
97
98 CARDOZO PUB. LAW POLICY rETHICS J.
this paper in the context of related and overlapping areas of the law: el-
der law, juvenile law and the case law interpreting the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
A. Elder Law
Elder law raises fundamental issues involving capacity,
property, health care, and zealous advocacy.1 56 As medical and techno-
logical advances allow persons to live longer, one of the greatest fears
(as with mental illness) is to "lose one's mind." Yet, the mere fact that
a person may be experiencing cognitive issues does not mean that his
or her needs, wants, and desires should be ignored. Even a client who
arguably lacks legal competence often has the ability to "understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting [his or
her] own well-being." Further, capacity is fluid and different legal
158acts require different degrees of capacity.
Elder law is different from many other types of law in that it of-
ten involves transactional and litigation matters where there is no clear
winner or loser.159 Guardianships take away many, if not all, rights of
allegedly incapacitated persons, and can take away their dignity by
stripping away the ability of such persons to make any decisions involv-
ing their life.160 Respect for client autonomy is a key component of
zealous advocacy.161 Moreover, the attorney should start with the pre-
sumption that the client has the necessary capacity to make decisions,
much like the presumption of innocence in criminal law.162 A lawyer
representing an elderly person facing guardianship must take into ac-
156 Joseph A. Rosenberg, Adapting Unitary Prinaples of Professional Responsibiity to Unique Prac-
tice Contexts: A Reflective Modelfor Resohing Ethical Dilemmas in Elder Law, 31 Loy. U. CH 1. L.J. 403,
405 (2000).
157 Mark Falk, Ethical Considerations in Representing the Elder#, 36 S.D. L. Rrv. 54, 67 (1991).
158 Robert B. Fleming & Rebecca C. Morgan, Laayers' Ethical Dilemmas: A 'Normal" Rela-
tionsho When Representing Demented Clients and their Families, 35 GA. L. REv. 735, 742 (2001).
159 Rosenberg, supra note 156, at 444 (Arguing that resolving ethical dilemmas "involves a
reconception of zealous advocacy, because the interests of the client may be difficult to discern
and the goals of representation do not always involve an easily quantified, win-lose outcome.")
10 Perlin, supra note 23.
161 Rosenberg, supra note 156, at 427. (Explaining how, in many nations, guardianship is a
kind of "civil death."). See Perlin, supra note 23, at 1166.
162 Falk, sepra note 157, at 68.
[Vol. 15:73
2016] HONOR CLIENT'S MENTAL HEALTH DECISIONS
count his client's wishes and not substitute his own judgment or take a
paternalistic approach.163 Further, attorneys who represent persons fac-
ing guardianships should take on an adversarial role in order to protect
the civil rights of their clients.164
Like persons with mental illness, elderly persons with cognitive
issues face sanism, heuristic biases and OCS, all of which lead to poor
outcomes for the marginalized individuals. Persons who suffer from
mental illness and are elderly "endure a double prejudice about who
they are, what desires and needs they have, and to what sort of life they
aspire."165 These desires include the right to sexual freedom.166 Yet due
to sanism and ageism,167 elderly people are perceived as asexual, or, if
interested in sex, then hypersexual to the point of perversion. 168In
some cases, sexual activity can lead to criminal prosecution.169 Elderly
persons face the same issues of unnecessary institutionalization that
persons with mental illness face, and despite the deinstitutionalization
movement, much of this population continues to reside unnecessarily
in institutions for years. 17 For elderly persons committed to, and una-
ble to be discharged from psychiatric institutions or nursing care facili-
ties against their will, presumptions about their abilities should be chal-
163 Fleming & Morgan, supra note 158, at 749. ("Lawyers are tempted to be paternalistic, to
protect the demented client by acting in her best interest, rather than advocating her wishes.").
See infra text accompanying notes 243-57 (explaining supported decision-making vs. substitut-
ed).
164 Rosenberg, supra note 156, at 473.
165 Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned but Not Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in
State Psychiatric Institutions, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 276 (1992).
166 Stephanie L. Tang, When "Yes" Might Mean 'No": Standardiging State Criteria to Evaluate the
Capacity to Consent to Sexual Activity for Eldery with Neurocognitive Disorders, 22 ELDER L.J. 449
(2015).
167 Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 453, 456 (1997)
(stereotyping and discrimination against people based on their age, including the rise of age
consciousness and age segregation).
168 Tang, supra note 166, at 458; see generally PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 127
169 Pam Belluck, Sex, Dementia nd a Husband on Trial at Age 78, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2015
at Al (covering an incident where husband of wife with dementia faced criminal prosecution
for third-degree felony sexual abuse for having sex with his wife in a nursing home); Pam Bel-
luck, Iowa Man Found Not Guily ofAbusing Ailing Wife with Algheimer's, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 22, 2015
at A18 (covering an incident where husband found not guilty by the jury). See PERLIN & LYNCH,
supra note 127, at 79-81
170 Kanter, supra note 165, at 276.
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lenged and litigation brought on their behalf to establish a right to
treatment in a community setting.171
Cultural competence is a key component in providing effective
representation and resolving any ethical dilemmas that may arise in el-
der law, just as it is in mental disability law.1 72 The link between illness
and the cultural and social context of a person's identity and communi-
ty influences the way in which illness is defined and perceived. 17  Be-
ing culturally competent is also a way to combat sanism, OCS, and heu-
ristics.174  Providing culturally competent representation ensures that
clients' civil rights will be protected and that their wishes are being fol-
lowed.
B. juvenile Law
Many of the same ethical issues that arise in elder and mental
disability law, are also present when representing juveniles. The Su-
preme Court in In Re Gault, recognized that due process requires the
right to counsel for juveniles facing delinquency cases."s The Court
found that proceeding where the child could be found delinquent and
subject to the loss of liberty for years is "comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution" and requires "the assistance of counsel to cope
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist
upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether [the child]
has a defense and to prepare and submit it." 7 6
171 Id. at 307.
172 See e.g., Casey Schutte, Mandating Cultural Competence Training for Dependeng Attorngs, 52
FAM. CT. REv. 564 (2014); Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, Making and Breaking Habits: Teaching (and
Learning) Cultural Context, Self-Awareness, and Intercultural Communication Through Case Supervision in a
Client-Service Legal Cnic, 28 WAsH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37 (2008); see generally Michael L. Perlin &
Valerie R. McClain, "Where Souls Are Forgotten ": Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations and Inter-
national Human Rights, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB. PoL'Y & L. 257 (2009).
173 Rosenberg, supra note 156, at 463.
174 Compare Paul R. Tremblay, Interviening and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases,
9 CLINICAL L. REv. 373 (2002) (on the use of heuristics as practical tools to focus on aspects of
culture that may affect the communication process in efforts to become more culturally compe-
tent in the interviewing and counseling context).
175 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
176 Id. at 36. As Rob Mason, Director of the Juvenile Division of the Fourth Circuit Public
Defender's Office stated "juvenile law is a special area of the law anchored in juvenile-specific
training and practice skills, and requires zealous advocacy that is individualized and develop-
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Despite the growing consensus on following a client-centered ap-
proach when representing juveniles, there is a lack of specialized train-
ing on how to interact with children in a non-suggestive and develop-
mentally-sensitive way.'77 The role of a zealous advocate is "far from
uniform in juvenile practice,""' and goes beyond zealous advocacy to
include "social work"-based legal practice."'7 In child custody cases in-
volving abuse or neglect, the role of the lawyer is even more unclear
and inconsistent.s0 This lack of specialized training and consistency in
representation exists also for persons with mental illness involved in the
justice system.
One of the major ethical dilemmas that face attorneys who rep-
resent juveniles is when counsel may usurp the client's autonomous de-
cision-making rights and raise the issue of whether the client is compe-
tent over the client's objection."' Some child advocates argue for a
paternalistic approach because the legal rights of juveniles are routinely
restricted in many areas; like the inability to vote, purchase alcoholic
beverages, work, and obtain medical care.182 Paternalistic advocacy per-
sists in efforts to not only rehabilitate children but also to completely
transfer decision-making authority from children to adults.83 Yet the
client may have a legitimate reason in not wanting his or her competen-
cy raised as an issue at trial.'" If a guardian is appointed or other agen-
cies become involved as part of a protective action under Model Rule
1.14, disclosures could be made to the Court and others that could hurt
the client at trial.185
mentally appropriate." Jan Pudlow, Juvenile Law Was a Long Time Coming, FLA. B. NEWS 1, 2
(Oct. 1, 2015).
17 David R. Katner, Revising Legal Ethics in Delinquengy Cases ly Consulting with Juveniles' Par-
ents, 79 UMKC L. REV. 595, 599 (2011).
178 Kristen Henning, Loealy, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of
Child's Counsel in Delinqueny Cases, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 245, 246 (2005).
179 Mary Leigh Martin, Specialidng in an Area of Need: Child Wefare Law Certification for Ver-
montAtorneys, 41 VT. B.J. 39 (Winter 2016).
180 Suparna Malempati, Ethics, Advocay, and the Child Client, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETi-lCsJ. 633, 639 (2014).
181 David R. Katner, The Ethical Struggle of Usurping juvenile ClientAutonomy hy Raising Compe-
teng in Delnqueng and Criminal Cases, 16 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 293, 295 (2007). See also infra,
text accompanying notes 243-57.
182 Id. at 308.
183 Henning, supra note 178, at 262.
184 Katner, supra note 181, at 311.
18s Id at 319.
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Another ethical issue that often arises is whether parents should
be consulted. Model Rule 1.14 appears to imply that counsel should
seek the appointment of a guardian rather than consult with the child's
parents, caregivers, or immediate family members."' Nonetheless, if
there is an adverse relationship between the child and parent, to consult
with the parent would create a conflict of interest.'17 Further, the par-
ent-directed approach assumes that the parents have a desire to act in
the best interests of their child, that the parents are more competent
than the child, and that the parents have a sufficient understanding of
the legal issues that face their child."'
Finally, the issue of capacity of a child due to cognitive and de-
velopmental limitations can potentially have a negative impact on the
attorney-client relationship.'9  Zealous advocacy not only depends on
the attorney's efforts but also on the ability of the child to engage in ef-
fective cognitive reasoning.' Instead of focusing on whether the child
is making the "correct" decision, the lawyer should focus on the ability
of the child to engage in the decision-making process."' Juveniles in-
volved in the justice system face the same prejudices and sanism that
elderly persons and persons with mental illness face.'92
Paternalistic approaches can lead to unnecessary and unjustified
institutionalization. Effective representation can combat paternalistic
attitudes and ensure that a juvenile's rights are protected.
IV. THE MULTI-TEXTURED MEANINGS OF CAPACITY AND
COMPETENCY
As previously discussed, the issue of capacity affects not just men-
186 Katner, supra note 177, at 612.
187 Id. at 613.
188 Henning, supra note 178, at 297. See also Matter of Williams, 356 A.2d 468 (N.J. Juv. &
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1976) (minor admitted to psychiatric hospital upon parental signature has the
right to sign himself out without parental consent).
189 Henning, supra note 178, at 270.
9 Id at 271.
191 Malempati, supra note 180, at 655.
192 Id.; see also supra note 166. On the relationship between sanism and therapeutic jurispru-
dence, see infra text accompanying notes 274-76, in the context of juvenile punishment, see Mi-
chael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun ": The International Human Rights and Ther-
apeuticJurisprudence Implcations ofJuvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEx. TECH L. REv. 301 (2013).
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tal disability law, but also touches upon all aspects of the law including
criminal law, elder law, and juvenile law.'93 Complicating the issues of
capacity is the fact that capacity (competency) is fluid. Further, differ-
ent legal acts require different thresholds for capacity.94 A finding of
incapacity in one area does not mean a person is incompetent for all
decisions or all future decisions."' It is also important to distinguish
incapacity from undue influence by a third party.196
One of the ethical issues that criminal attorneys face is whether or
not to raise the issue of competency and by extension, whether to raise
the issue of competency over the defendant's objection."' The issue of
competency for mentally ill defendants is further complicated by the
pretextuality that permeates all aspects of the court process.' An at-
torney must be both a zealous advocate and an officer of the Court and
those duties conflict when a criminal defendant may be incompetent.'99
Before a defense attorney makes the determination that a competency
evaluation is necessary, the potentially disastrous consequences for the
defendant for even merely participating in the evaluation must be con-
sidered.20
Raising the issue of competency of a client can lead to a guardian-
193 See infra text accompanying notes 135-49 and 155-92.
194 Raymond C. O'Brien, Attorney Responsibifidy and Clent Incapacity, 30 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & PoL'Y 59, 72 (2013). See also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d
74 (1986). Some advocates also argue that there is a distinction with juvenile decision-making
capabilities when facing criminal charges verses juveniles seeking to make healthcare decisions
without knowledge or consent of their parents. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepan-
cies: Forging a Common Understanding ofAdolescent Competence in Healthcare Decison-making and Crimi-
nalResponsibity, 6 NEv. L.J. 927 (2006).
195 Nina A. Kohn & Catheryn Koss, Lawyers for Legal Ghosts: The Lgaity and Ethics of Repre-
senting Persons Subject to Guardianship, 91 WASH. L. REV. 581, 585 (2016).
196 O'Brien, supra note 194, at 72.
197 Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Clent's Best Interests: The Defense LanYer's Dilemma
When Mentally Il/ Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1343 (1998). See general-
American Bar Association, Criminal justice Section Standards,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice-section archive/crimjust-standard
s_mentalhealthtoc.htnl (last visited August 7, 2016). See also Perlin, supra note 5, at 358-61.
198 Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 66, at 631-39.
199 John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution ofJudgment: Ethics and the Mentally Ill Crimi-
nalDefendant, 58 AM. U. L. REv 207, 209 (2008)
200 King, supra note 199, at 239
103
104 CAiRDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY &ETHICS J.
ship proceeding.201 For persons subject to guardianships, whether they
are limited or plenary guardianships, they still can - at least theoretically
under prevailing domestic law - maintain meaningful rights under state
and constitutional aw. 202 Being subject to a guardianship does not pre-
vent a person from entering into an enforceable, implied contract for
certain attorney services.203 Further, the right to procedural and sub-
stantive due process is not extinguished by guardianship.204 For an at-
torney representing someone subject to a guardianship, the attorney
must maintain a normal attorney-client relationship unless the attorney
reasonably believes that doing so would place the client at risk of sub-
stantial physical, financial or other harm.205
A. Forced Treatment Issues
Persons with mental illness are often subject to forced treatment
that occurs both in an institutional and outpatient setting.206 The right
to refuse treatment is a constitutionally protected right and the burden
is on the proponent of involuntary medication to prove that the person
lacks capacity in order to override this right.207 When representing per-
sons with mental illness facing forced treatment it is important that the
attorney is aware of the humiliating consequences that arise from taking
208away their client's autonomy and ability to direct their own care.
Informed consent has become the basis for all medical interven-
tion and requires that that the person is capable of understanding the
information presented, competent, free from undue influence, and that
201 ABA Model Rules, supra note 117, at 1.14 (b).
202 Kohn & Koss, supra note 195 at 590-91.
203 Id. at 594.
204 Id. at 598. See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (where persons with
mental disabilities who were involuntarily committed were found to have constitutionally pro-
tected due process rights) and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing that
procedural due process depends on; the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of such interests, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards and the govern-
ment's interest including fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional due process re-
quirement would entail).
205 Kohn & Koss, supra note 195, at 636.
206 See generally Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 147, 5 8-1 et seq.
207 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
20 Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 17 at 30.
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the decision is voluntary.209 Regarding the right to refuse treatment, the
issue becomes not only whether the person is incompetent, but also
whether the treatment is the least restrictive alternative and whether the
benefits of treatment outweigh the risks.210 Coercing consent for
treatment of persons with mental illness legally and ethically invalidates
informed consent.211
For persons with mental illness facing criminal charges, the issue
of forced treatment remains controversial and highly contested.212 In
Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when a mentally ill
defendant faces serious criminal charges, the government may involun-
tarily administer antipsychotic drugs if the treatment is medically ap-
propriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that undermine the
trial's fairness, and necessary to further important government trial-
related interests.213  This test is different from the one set forth in
Washington v. Harper, which limited the right of convicted felons to
refuse treatment and found the need to balance the liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted treatment with prison safety and security.214 Sell also
differs from Riggins v. Nevada (a case involving a competent insanity
defense-pleader), where the Supreme Court held that use of antipsy-
chotic medication violated the defendant's right to a fair trial and fo-
cused on the litigational side effects that might have compromised the
defendant's participation in trial.215 Attorneys representing criminal de-
fendants with mental illness must not only be familiar with the law, but
also the consequences of forced treatment on their clients' potential
outcomes at trial.
2 Talati, supra note 143 at 174, 176-77. See also Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 147, § 12-1.5.
210 Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497-98 (1986).
211 Talati, supra note 143, at 199.
212 Perlin & Cucolo. supra note 147.
213 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
214 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 147; Michael
L. Perlin & Naorni Weinstein, The Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Setting, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (Richard Rosner et al eds. 2016) (forthcoming).
215 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 147; 5§ 8-7-8-7.4.
Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 17.
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B. Psychiatric Advance Directives
One way to address the issue of wavering capacity for persons
with mental illness is through the use of psychiatric advance direc-
tives. 216 A psychiatric advance directive is a legally enforceable docu-
ment that specifies the manner in which treatment decisions are to be
made in the event the person later becomes incompetent.217 It can
specify both who should make treatment decisions and also what spe-
cific treatment should be administered, including psychiatric medica-
tion, in the event of incapacity. Competency to execute a psychiatric
advance directive requires the ability to understand and appreciate the
risks and benefits of treatment, the ability to engage in rational delibera-
tion, and the capability of understanding the meaning and significance
of the delegation.218
The use of these psychiatric advance directives may have signifi-
cant therapeutic value.219 Such directives can empower persons with
mental illness to have control over their treatment and may encourage
their clinicians to treat them with dignity and respect, rather than pater-
nalistically.220 They can foster a more collaborative model of care for
psychiatric treatment and encourage voluntary treatment.221 They may
also avoid the need for a finding of judicial incapacity2 22 and could
avoid the need for a guardian.22 3
Nevertheless, psychiatric advance directives raise serious ethical is-
216 For an earlier consideration in the commitment context, see Rebecca Dresser, Ulysses
and the Pychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Anasis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. L.
REv. 777 (1981-82). This flows from the theory first advanced in ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW: A SYsTEM IN TRANSITION 66-70 (1975) (in some cases physicians are justi-
fied in overriding a patient's wishes because the patient would thank the physician if she could);
this has been labeled as the "Thank You Theory," discussed in this context in Dresser, supra, at
789-91.
217 Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Pychiatric Care: A Theoretical and Practical
Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 746 (1998).
218 Id. at 777.
219 Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. MIAM1 L.
REv. 57, 81 (1996).
220 Id. at 81, 83.
221 Gallagher, supra note 217, at 783.
222 Winick, supra note 219, at 84.
M Judy A. Clausen, Making the Case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statute, 14
YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 19 (2014).
[Vol. 15:73
2016] HONOR CLIENT'S MENTAL HEALTH DECISIONS
sues when it comes to the issue of potential revocation is raised.224 The
most important issue to be considered is whether psychiatric advance
directives should override the constitutional right to refuse medica-
tion.225 This issue applies not just to persons facing institutionalization
but also persons with mental illness who are in the criminal justice sys-
tem.226 Some psychiatric advance directives purport to be irrevocable
which can cause particular problems for patients who have chosen to
be treated with specific medication.227 Even if refusing psychiatric
treatment may limit the person's ability to act autonomously and even
to lose competency, the person may authoritatively choose that course
of action while still competent.2 8  Consider the case of a patient who
seeks to enforce her right to refuse antipsychotic medication but who
previously agreed to a psychiatric advance directive listing specific med-
ication to which she would consent; should the advance directive over-
ride her right to refuse treatment? Does it matter if the client can articu-
late the side-effects she is experiencing?229 What if the client no longer
believes he or she is suffering from a mental illness; would that auto-
matically make them incompetent?230
Psychiatric advance directives also create issues when a treating
clinician who is unfamiliar with the patient may be reluctant to adminis-
ter the specific treatment,231 or does not think following the patient's
224 Winick, supra note 219, at 86. On the question of increased costs connected to the use
of such directives, see Nancy Rhoden, The Limits of legal Oliectivity, 68 N.C.L. REv. 845 (1990).
225 Gallagher, supra note 217, at 762-67.
226 Robert D. Miller, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: A View from the Trenches, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 728, 743 (1998).
227 Gallagher, supra note 217 at 779.
228 Mark J. Cherry, Non-Consensual Treatment is (Near# Always) Morally Impermissible, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 789, 792 (2010).
229 The Supreme Court has specifically identified the potential of side effects as a factor to
be considered in refusal of medication decision-making. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127 (1992).
230 See generally Winick, supra note 219. In one study, 21% of medication refusers denied be-
ing mentally ill, see Steven Ken Hoge et al., A Prospective Multicenter Study of Patients' Refusal ofAn-
tpgychoic Medication, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 949, 951 (1990).
231 Winick, supra note 219, at 71. See also Bruce J. Winick, Client Denial and Resistance in the
Advance Directive Context: Reflections on How Attorneys Can Identifi and Deal with a Psycholegal Soft Spot,
4 PsYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 901, 903 (1998) ("A court may, in the event of their incompetency,
choose someone else to play this role, perhaps someone unfamiliar with the person's values and
preferences.").
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advance directives would be in the patient's best interests.232 Further,
patients may be subject to coercion with regard to their decision-
233making as to whether or not to accept a psychiatric advance directive.
In an ideal world, psychiatric advance directives could provide a mean-
ingful way for clients to direct their own care according to their own
wishes.234 However, because of the limitations of the mental health
system that already exists, there are ethical issues and concerns that at-
torneys must be aware of in order to provide the best representation
for their clients.
C Right to Sexual Interactions
The right to voluntary sexual interaction for persons with mental
disabilities is a controversial topic. 235 The Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized the right to sexual privacy in Lawrence v. Texas.236 In strik-
ing down a Texas statute that criminalized certain intimate voluntary
sexual conduct engaged in by two persons of the same sex, the Court
emphasized the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of
a person making intimate and personal choices.237 However, the Su-
preme Court has not directly addressed issues involving collateral sexu-
al privacy rights, such as individual right to purchase and use of sexual
aids, a question about which the federal circuit courts have split.238
Sanism and pretexuality rob persons with mental disabilities from
basic dignity and from exercising their right to sexuality in institutional
settings.ns Compounding the issue is that there is no standard to de-
232 Miler, supra note 226, at 732.
3 Winick, supra note 219, at 88.
234 Gallagher, supra note 217, at 782.
5 Perlin, supra note 8, at 483.
236 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
27 Id. at 574.
238 Compare Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004)
(declining to extrapolate from dicta in Lawrence a right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny
in upholding a statutory ban on the sale of sexual devices), with Reliable Consultants v. Earle,
517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (striking down statute criminalizing sale of sexual devices, finding
that statute impermissibly burdened customer's due process rights to engage in private intimate
conduct).
9 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 127, at 272-73.
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termining competency to engage in sexual interaction because of the
fluidity of such a determination.2" At the most basic, the test requires
that an individual have the capacity to understand there is a decision to
be made and have an ability to consent or not.241
Elderly persons face the same discrimination when it comes to
voluntary sexual interaction that persons with mental disabilities face.
Sexuality does not disappear with age and it may take on even greater
importance for persons with dementia because it can provide a sense of
connection to other people.242 As with other aspects of the law, it is
important for attorneys in dealing with these issues to not substitute
their own judgment in place of that of their clients.243
D. Supported Decision-Making under International and Domestic Law
As we noted earlier, supported decision-making rather than sub-
stituted decision-making is the centerpiece of the CRPD under Article
12 and must be at the forefront of any discussion on this area of law
and social policy.2" Article 12 of the CRPD guarantees that persons
with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons be-
fore the law.245 To be recognized as full persons before the law means
that one's legal capacity, including the capacity to act, is equally recog-
nized.2" Article 12 underscores the importance of legal capacity as an
24 Id. at 264.
241 Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexualiy and Incapacid, 76 OH-no ST. L.J. 1201, 1217 (2015).
242 Id. at 1248.
243 See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 151, at 139.
244 See supra notes 22-23. Although the United States has not ratified the CRPD, "a state's
obligations under it are controlled by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties[,] which
requires signatories 'to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention's] ob-
ject and purpose."' Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Cents
with Limited Competency in Guardianshep Proceedings, 4 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362-
63 (2011) (discussing In re Mark CH., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010) (finding that
guardianship appointments must be subject to requirements of periodic reporting and review).
We discuss this in Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 17, at 31 n. 187.
245 CRPD Article 12, supra note 15.
246 International Disability Alliance, Legal Opinion on Artick 12 of CRPD, 2010,
http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/resources/legal-opinion-article-12-crpd (last vis-
ited Aug. 14, 2016). See also Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabidlies and its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under International Iaw, 25 GA. ST.
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inalienable right and provides for safeguards to ensure that a person's
capacity is not subject to abuse.247 Instead of paternalistic guardianship
laws, the CRPD's supported-decision making model "recognizes first,
that all people have the right to make decisions and choices about their
own lives."248 This principle must guide attorneys when faced with eth-
ical questions regarding a client's capacity.
Supported decision-making is also reinforced in US law under
the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Title II of the ADA pro-
hibits discrimination based on disabilities by public entities in their ser-
249vices, programs, or activities. Guardianships unnecessarily isolate
persons with psychosocial impairments.250 This unjustified isolation
can be viewed as discrimination based on a disability in violation of the
ADA. 251 A declaration of incapacity by the Court can lead to feelings
of helplessness and loss of control, which are detrimental to a person's
mental well-being and create feelings of shame and humiliation.252 Sub-
stituted decision-making can lead to unjustified confinement for per-
sons with mental illness.25 3 When attorneys use substituted judgment in
making legal decisions for their clients, there are no checks and balanc-
254es.
Supported decision-making allows individuals with limitations to
receive support in order to understand relevant information and availa-
ble choices in order to make decisions based on their preferences, in-
stead of completely taking away their ability to make any decisions.255
Attorneys representing persons with diminished capacity must carefully
consider their client's wishes and assist them in making legal decisions.
It is important to consider the context in which individuals face deci-
U. L. REv. 527, 559 (2009); Perlin, supra note 23, at 1176.
247 Robert Dinerstein, Esme Grant Grewal & Jonathan Martinis, Emerging International
Trends and Practices in Guardianshtp Law for People with Disabilities, 22 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 435,
444 (2016).
248 Kanter, supra note 246, at 563.
249 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
250 Leslie Salzman, Guardiansbi for Persons nith Mental Illness-A Legal and Appropriate Alter-
naive?, 4 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 279, 289 (2011).
251 Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionali.Zaion: The Definition of 'Institution" and the Fu-
ture of OlmsteadLitigaion, 17 TEX.J. ON C.L. & C.R. 143, 152 (2012).
252 Salzman, supra note 23, at 184. See also Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 17 at 38.
253 Salzman, supra note 250, at 290.
254 Ross, supra note 197, at 1373.
255 Salzman, supra note 250, at 306.
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sions and not just the personal characteristics of the individual with a
disability.256 Education and training are also important for all parties in-
volved in supported decision-making, including the clients.27  Attor-
neys should only intrude on their clients' autonomy in the short-term
and only to the extent necessary to facilitate their clients' autonomy in
the long term.258
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 259
Over the past two decades, one of the most significant legal theo-
retical developments has been the creation and dynamic growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence.260 One of the co-authors (MLP) has de-
scribed this development:
[I]herapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the
impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic
agent, the law [] can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequenc-
es.261 The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be re-
shaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating
256 Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making:
A Viabk Alternative to Guardianshp?, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1111, 1153 (2013).
257 Id.
258 Dlugacz, supra note 5, at 340.
259 This section is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 192; Perlin & Lynch, supra
note 146, and Perlin, Wasteland, supra note 33. Further, it distills the work of one of the co-
authors (MLP) over the past two decades, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 623 (1993).
26 0See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK,
CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two
Decades of Therapeutic Juriprudence, 24 TOURO L. REv. 17 (2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note
147, 5 2-6, at 2-43-2-66. Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National In-
stitute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health
Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992).
261See Michael L. Perlin, 'His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will Jurors
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REv. 885, 912 (2009); see
also Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Juriprudence, in DISPUTES
AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds., 2006) (for a transna-
tional perspective).
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due process principles.262
David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent tension inherent
in this inquiry must be resolved: "[1] he law's use of mental health in-
formation to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon
justice concerns."263 As one of us (MLP) has written elsewhere, "[A]n
inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic con-
cerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."264
Therapeutic jurisprudence "look[s] at law as it actually impacts
people's lives"265 and assesses law's influence on "emotional life and
psychological well-being."266 Therapeutic jurisprudence mandates that
"law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing
anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent
with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing
and wel1ness."267 From therapeutic jurisprudence, we gain "a new and
distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into the
law and its applications."268 Therapeutic jurisprudence is ". . . a sea-
262 E.g., Michael L. Perlin, 'The judge, He Cast His Robe Aside": Mental Health Courts, Dgniy
and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & PoL'YJ. 1, 7-8 (2013); Perlin, supra note 7, at 751. On
how therapeutic jurisprudence "might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a
means of 'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist fagade,"' see Perlin, Mirror, supra note 29, at 591 (quot-
ing, in part PERLIN, supra note 105, at 301). See also Ian Freckelton, TherapeuticJurisprudence Misun-
derstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks ofInfluence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 575, 585-
86 (2008). On sanism, see supra text accompanying notes 40-65.
263 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See generally David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeuticaly, 5
APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
264 Perlin, supra note 52, at 412 (emphasis in original); Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds
Hit Heaty on the Borderlne": Mental Disabikty Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 775, 782 (1998).
265 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims of
Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
266 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and Strategies, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Dennis P.
Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
267 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Juriprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIvIL
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
268 Freckelton, supra note 261, at 576. It is also part of a growing comprehensive move-
ment in the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of han-
dling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. Susan Daicoff, Afterword: The Role of
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change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement to-
wards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law ...
[emphasizing] psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism."269
It thus supports an ethic of care.270
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation
and voluntariness, arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have
a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and
taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.
When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice
and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and val-
idation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the liti-
gant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling
on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process
that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that
affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved
behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel
that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.272
A. The Role of Dignity
A core central principle of therapeutic jurisprudence is a comnut-
Therapeutic jurisprudence nithin the Comprehensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, stpra note 265, at 465.
269 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. &
MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement:
Challenges for the TJ Lanyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler,
The Use of Therapeutic jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law
Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006).
270 See e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 268, at 605-07; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party
Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns about Therapeutic Juriprudence
Criminal Defense Lauyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra note 268. The use
of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
271 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Heless Lanyer Clnical Legal Education and Therapeutic juris-
prudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 ToURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance
of "voice," see also Freckelton, supra note 261, at 588.
272 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: TherapeuticJuripru-
dence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002) (internal citations omitted). See
general# AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
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ment to dignity.273 In a recent article about dignity and the civil com-
mitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum
embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus
specifically on this issue of voice: "When procedures give people an
opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions
are explained to them their views taken into account, and they substan-
tively feel less coercion."274
The question to be posed here is this: can we adhere to Professor
Ronner's "3 V's", unless we eschew the level of paternalism that is
mandated by the "best interests" model? David Wexler made it clear
almost a quarter of a century ago that "[t]herapeutic jurisprudence in no
way supports paternalism, coercion, or a therapeutic state."275 The "pa-
ternalistic role" of lawyers at [civil commitment] hearings represents
sarusm and pretextuality, and turns the adversary process into a "farce
and a mockery,"276 in such a way that repudiates therapeutic jurispru-
dence. Forensic psychologist Kathy Faulkner Yates has urged the use of
therapeutic jurisprudence as a "diagnostic tool to identify the malignant
way that pretextuality poisons forensic and judicial relationships."
The best interests model - one that inevitably leads to substituted
decision-making - is the essence of the paternalism that Professor
Wexler rejects. It is utterly incompatible with any and all of the precepts
of therapeutic jurisprudence. We believe that it is only through the
embrace of TJ can the issues that we raise here be resolved in a way
that, per Professor Ronner, provides dignity to persons with mental
disabilities by honoring the principles of "voice, validation and volun-
,278tariness."
273 See BRUCE J. Winick, Civil Commitment: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161
(2005). On dignity in the sentencing process generally, see PERLIN, supra note 95, at 214-15.
274 Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Degnifying Madness: Rethinking Commitment
Law in an Age ofMass Incarceration, 70 U. M1AI L. REv. 1, 51 (2015).
275 David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conven-
tional Mental Health Law Scholarshp, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 759, 762 (1993).
276 Perlin, supra note 25, at 26 (quoting, in part, Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic jurisprudence
and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41 (1999)1.
277 Kathy Faulkner Yates, Therapeutic Issues Associated With Confidentiality and Informed Consent
in Forensic Evaluations, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 345, 357-58 (1994).
278 See Ronner, supra note 271, at 94-95.
[Vol. 15:73
2016] HONOR CLIENT'S MENTAL HEALTH DECISIONS
VI. CONCLUSION
As we noted above,279 the law review literature is astonishingly
bereft of considerations of "zealous advocacy" in the context of the
representation of persons with mental disabilities. We hope, modestly,
that this article leads others to consider the issues we discuss here, and
build on our work. We offer these thoughts in the hopes that that does
happen.
First, client autonomy must be in the forefront of any client-
attorney relationship, and an attorney must thus always follow their cli-
ents' wishes except for in very limited cases (where there is a pre-
existing finding of civil incompetency). Second, if an attorney feels that
a client is unable to make a decision completely on her own, the attor-
ney should seek out others who might assist in supported decision-
making; an attorney should never substitute her own judgment for
"what is best."280 Third, persons with mental disabilities have the same
civil rights as all other persons; the existence of a question as to compe-
tency does not mean that a person is stripped of all their decision-
making power, or that the person's expressed needs/desires are not val-
id.
Fourth, the pressure will likely be the greatest in cases that involve
the exact controversies (the ""How can you do that?" cases)281 that
create the most dissonance and are likely of the greatest importance to
the client - questions involving involuntary medication and sexual au-
tonomy. Fifth, attorneys must take seriously international human rights
law that mandates such supported decision-making. Finally, attorneys
must embrace the principles and tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence as
a means of best ensuring the dignity of their clients and of maximizing
the likelihood that voice, validation and voluntariness282 will be en-
hanced.
279 See supra text accompanying note 137.
280 Compare e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons nth Mental Disabities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15, 25 (1993-94) ("Thus, employment decisions cannot
be based on 'paternalistic views' of what is best for a person with a disability") (emphasis
added).
281 See supra text accompanying notes 3-5, and 193-242.
282 See Ronner, supra note 271.
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The narrator of Dylan's song, As I Went out One Morning,283 lo-
cates himself clearly in the ambit of Tom Paine.284 Paine was the phi-
losopher who considered "rights of the mind" among the natural liber-
ties. 2 We hope that this article encourages lawyers who represent
persons with mental disabilities to similarly locate themselves, and to
privilege-not subordinate-the autonomy in decision-making that all
persons with mental disabilities deserve. As with the narrator in Dylan's
song, simply put, she has no choice.
283 Supra note 34.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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